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BLUE SKY RESTRICTIONS ON NEW
BUSINESS PROMOTIONS
JAMES S. MOFSKY*
Blue sky law restrictions, although often providing a
significant impediment to the development of new enterprises,
have received little attention in regard to their actual economic
effect. The author surveys the various regulatory approaches
taken by restrictive and non-restrictive states, exploring the
relative economic inhibitions of each. Particular attention is
given to the limitations upon financing new businesses,
retaining promoter control and insuring a sufficient reward for
entrepreneurship.
p ROMOTERS OF new ventures are constantly confronted with blue
sky laws which severely restrict entrepreneurial activities and
which often result in innovations either being sold to existing
businesses or abandoned entirely, rather than being developed by
new firms. Whether the net economic loss emanating from such
regulation is insignificant is debatable-but it has never been mea-
sured. Federal securities regulation and recent dramatic develop-
ments in the area of so-called "federal corporation law" have
attracted most of the talents and imagination of scholars and practi-
tioners, and consequently the study of the blue sky laws has been
neglected. Practically no economic or legal analysis of blue sky law
problems exists and seldom are the activities of state administrators
reported. In fact, many lawyers are barely cognizant of the existence
of the state statutes and the agencies created to administer these
laws. The impact of controls in this area, however, is certainly sub-
stantial as blue sky regulation becomes an ever-increasing fact of
business life. Surely, the economic effects of such regulation warrant
more careful attention than has been received to date.
In theory a promoter satisfies the requirements of the federal
securities laws if he fully and fairly discloses the pertinent
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information with respect to his promotion.' The Securities and
Exchange Commission is not empowered to make judgments
concerning the merits of the venture. However, the full disclosure
requirements contained in most blue sky laws are designed to
provide state administrators with data from which they can make
qualitative decisions regarding the "fairness" of the proposed
offering and the "reasonableness" of aspects of the financial plan
If the new enterprise does not meet certain statutory and
administrative standards of quality, most state administrators are
provided with the means to prevent or stop the sale of the securities
in their jurisdictions.3 Such regulation frequently comes into
immediate conflict with the plans and requirements of the
organizers of new firms.
I Regarding the full disclosure philosophy underlying the federal securities laws, see I L.
Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 121-28 (2d ed. 1961); H. SOWARDS, THE FEDERAL
SECURMES ACT § 1.01 (1965).
See L. Loss & E. CowET, BLUE SKY LAW 36-37 (1958).
In those jurisdictions which have adopted § 306(a) of the Uniform Securities Act, state
administrators are empowered to issue stop orders or deny effectiveness to registration
statements for certain stated reasons which include findings that: (1) the offering would work
or tend to work a fraud upon purchasers. (2) the underwriting and selling discounts and
commissions are unreasonable in amount, (3) the amounts of promoters' profits or
participation are unreasonable, or (4) the amounts or kinds of options are unreasonable. For
a list of those jurisdictions which have enacted the Uniform Securities Act in whole or in
part, see note 12 infra. In eight states, securities administrators are granted authority to deny
registration for reasons which include findings: (I) that the issuer is in any way dishonest, (2)
that the issuer is of bad business repute, (3) that the issuer's affairs are in an unsound
condition, or (4) that the business or the security of the issuer is not based upon sound
business principles. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.11 (Supp. 1969); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 502.10 (Supp. 1968); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:709 (1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78-11
(1965); ORE. REV. STAT. § 59.105 (1968); S.D. CODE § 55,1907 (1939); 'VT. STAT. ANN. § 9-
4211 (1947); W. 'VA. CODE ANN. § 3273(10) (1961). Finally, the statutory standards upon which
securities may be qualified for sale in some states are phrased in terms of the securities being
"fair, just and equitable," and not working a fraud. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 25140 (West
Supp. 1968); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-08.1 (Supp. 1967); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 189.13
(1957). Based upon the various forms of statutory authority described above, many of the
state securities administrators have adopted rules and regulations limiting the amounts
of promoters' participation, options and underwriting expenses to specific percentages. See. e.g.,
those rules cited in notes 29 and 40 infra. State administrators employ many of the foregoing
broad standards on a case-by-case basis where a rule in point has not been adopted.
Such wide discretion on the part of administrators borders on being absolute in practice; it
is unlikely that many issuers would contest an adverse ruling by such administrators. The
costs, delays and unfavorable publicity connected with such a challenge would, in most
instances, force the issuer to seek alternative means of financing, such as an offering in a
less restrictive state. The paucity of cases involving challenge of administrators' broad discre-
tion is some evidence in support of this conclusion.
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The problem originates when a person has a new idea but lacks
funds to turn it into a tangible reality. He may attempt to sell it
outright, if it is patentable, or he may attempt to sell it and reserve
a percentage of the profits when the ultimate product or service is
marketed. However, it may be difficult or even impossible to find a
purchaser who believes in the profitability; it is not uncommon for
entrepreneurs to value their creations higher than others are willing
to pay. Finally, the organizer may elect to risk promoting it
himself and thus capture all of the profits. Thus, forced by
circumstances or choice to promote his own firm, he must seek
outside venture capital.
Pension funds, banks, insurance companies, and other financial
institutions generally reject long-term loan applications from new
promotions unless there is adequate collateral. Even assuming the
availability of loans for such ventures, it is doubtful whether debt
financing is the appropriate method for capitalizing most new
firms; the high cost of such loans and the required periodic interest
payments in the early stages of the firms' development may be
disastrous The Small Business Act' has not furnished adequate
relief. Although the Small Business Administration may provide
the entire capital necessary to promote certain ghetto housing
developments, it generally does not make loans to other new
businesses unless the loan applicant matches SBA funds on an
equal basis! This financial assistance will not help entrepreneurs
with a good idea but no assets. Thus, the equity securities market
may be the only source for capitalizing most speculative ventures.
And in theory, this market fulfills the requirements of promoters
and investors. It permits the promoter to retain control and allows
IWhile these financial institutions may loan funds to firms that survive the "beginning
period" and produce evidence of profitability, new promotions are usually formed without
the assistance of established financial intermediaries and must depend upon the personal
resources of the owners and their relatives and friends. See Jones, Financing Small Business,
in CREATIVE BUSINESS FINANCING 55-60 (V. Nordin ed. 1968).
'See FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.,. REPORT ON FINANCING SMALL
BUSINESS 402-03 (Comm. Print 1958); E. HOLLANDER, THE FUTURE OF SMALL BUSINESS 129
(1967); SBA MANAGEMENT RESEARCH SUMMARY, FACTS ABOUT SMALL BUSINESS
FINANCING (1967); Wilhelm, How Small Business Competes for Funds, II LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 220, 225 (1946).
15 U.S.C. § 631 (1964).
'See SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, SBA BUSINESS LOANS (1967).
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distribution of the risk to a number of investors. But the ability of
the promoter to utilize this market is severely limited by the federal
and state securities laws.
Unless some exemption is available, an offering of securities
requires registration under and compliance with the Securities Act
of 1933 and the blue sky laws of the states in which the securities
are offered for sale The most commonly used exemption permits
the private or limited offering of securities to a few persons. If such
an offering is made on an intrastate basis, promoters need comply
only with the provisions of the statutes of the state wherein the
securities are offered? However, if the securities are offered to
residents of two or more states, there must be observance of the
appropriate private offering provisions of the Securities Act of
193310 as well as the state statutes.
There is some form of limited offering exemption available in
47 states. While the Uniform Securities Act has been enacted, in
I The expenses of registration and compliance are considerable, generally running a
minimum of $30,000 for a full registration under the federal statute plus between $200 and
$3,000 per state, and statutes and rules in most states severely restrict the public promotion
of new ventures. It is often difficult if not impossible to secure a reputable underwriter for a
venture-capital offering, and most promoters are not capable of effecting a public
distribution and then maintaining an "after-market" without the assistance of a qualified
underwriter. For these and other reasons, promoters of new enterprises generally attempt to
raise capital privately, and accordingly avail themselves of an exemption from registration.
For a discussion of the costs of a public offering, see Wheat & Blackstone, Guideposts for a
First Public Offering, 15 Bus. LAW. 539 (1960).
9 Section 3(a)(! I) of the Securities Act of 1933 provides an exemption from registration
for -[a]ny security which is part of an issue offered and sold only to persons resident within
a single State or Territory, where the issuer of such security is a person resident and doing
business within, or, if a corporation, incorporated by and doing business within, such State
or Territory." 15 U.S.C. § 77(c) (1964).
"1 The basis of the federal private offering exemption is found in § 4(2) of the Securities
Act of 1933 ("transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering"). 15 U.S.C.
§ 7(d) (1964). Although there is no "magic" number under the federal act, an early SEC
release hinted that twenty-five was the top figure. This number refers to "offerees" and not
to ultimate purchasers. These offerees must be financially sophisticated persons who comprise
a related and restricted group, and securities may be offered to them only via direct
negotiations, without public solicitation or advertisement. Furthermore, each offeree should
be furnished adequate information concerning the company's affairs, its financial condition
and the use of the proceeds solicited. Purchasers of the securities must take for investment,
and in this respect, the usual precautionary practice is to secure investment letters, print
restrictive legendson the face of the certificates and place stop-transfer orders against the
shares.
", Although the statutes of Minnesota, Rhode Island, South Dakota and Vermont do not
expressly provide for limited dffering exemptions, these states have been included in this
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whole, in part or with modification, in 24 states 2 and the District
of Columbia, there still remain wide differences among the state
securities laws. It is not surprising, therefore, to find a variety of
types of limited offering exemptions. For purposes of simplicity,
these exemptions may be generally categorized as follows: (1)
exemptions characterized by the number of permissible
"offerees, ' ' 13 (2) exemptions characterized by the ultimate number
number because the isolated sale exemption is available to the "issuer or owner" in their
statutes. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 80.06(2) (1968); R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 7-11-8(a) (1956);
S.D. CODE § 55.1904(I) (1939); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4204(3) (1947) ("owner"). Limited
offering exemptions are not present in the statutes of New Hampshire, Delaware and
Connecticut. However, such exemptions would not be needed in Delaware and Connecticut
where there are no statutes requiring registration of securities. Thus, some form of limited
offering can be accomplished in all states except New Hampshire. Although the New York
statute does not expressly provide for such an exemption, it does exempt offerings with
respect to which a registration statement is not required to be filed under the Securities Act
of 1933 for reasons other than the intrastate exemption. See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 359-
ff(5) (McKinney Supp. 1968). New York has thus, indirectly, adopted the private offering
exemption available under the federal act.
11 Ala., Alas., Ark., Colo., Hawaii, Idaho, Ind., Kan., Ky., Md., Mich., Mo., Mont., Neb.,
Nev., N.J., N.M., Okla., Ore.; S.C., Utah, Va., Wash., Wyo.
11 Exemptions limiting the number of offerees have been enacted in 27 states. ALA. CODE
ANN. tit 53, § 38(i) (Supp. 1967); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 45.55.140(b)(5) (1962); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 67-1248(b)(9) (1966); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125-1-13(2)0) (1963); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 517.06(il) (Supp. 1969); GA. CODE ANN. § 97-107j) (1968); HAWAII REV.
LAWS § 199-5(i) (Supp. 1965); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1435(8) (1967); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
121- , § 137.4(G) (Supp. 1969); IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-855(b)(10) (Supp. 1968); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 502.5(15) (Supp. 1968): Ky. Ray. STAT. § 292.410(9) (1962); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 51:705 (12) (Supp. 1969); MD. ANN. CODE art. 32A, § 26(b)(9) (1967); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 451.802(b)(9) (1967); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 409A02(b)(9) (1967); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 15-2014(8) (1967); NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-1111(9) (Supp. 1965); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 90.075 (1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-50(b)(9) (Supp. 1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 784(7)
(1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 401(b)(9) (1965); ORE. REV. STAT. § 59.035(12)
(1967): S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-52(9) (1962): TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-5(1) (1964);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 21.20.320(9) (1961); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-117-14(b)(9) (1965).
Most of the foregoing statutes contain exemptions for post-incorporation offers directed to
not more than a stated number of persons (ranging from 10 to 25 offerees) during any twelve
month period, providing that the seller reasonably believes all the buyers are purchasing for
investment and no commission or other remuneration is paid for soliciting offerees. With
respect to this post-incorporation exemption, it is not unusual to find promoters exhausting
the total number of permissible offerees before a single dollar is raised.
This exemption is supplemented in several states by a pre-incorporation subscription
exemption permitting an offering to an unlimited number of persons if no commission or
other remuneration is paid, the ultimate number of subscribers does not exceed a stated figure
(ranging from 10 to 25), and no payment is made by any subscriber. Before payment may be
made for pre-incorporation subscriptions, the securities must be registered or an exemption
must be found. To avoid registration after obtaining subscriptions, promoters generally rely
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of shareholders of the corporation," (3) exemptions limited by the
number of buyers and a dollar amount, 5 and (4) isolated sale
exemptions available to the issuer. 6 Statutes of a few states contain
more than one of the above exemptions.
While the limited offering exemptions vary in certain respects
from state to state, some significant factors remain constant. For
example, of the 47 state statutes containing limited offering
exemptions, 36 states forbid commissions or other remuneration in
the preincorporation and/or post-incorporation stages. 7 This
means that in the great majority of jurisdictions promoters are
precluded from using the services of investment bankers or other
intermediaries in the private placement of securities.
The prohibition against commissions or other remuneration in
connection with a limited offering is intended to prevent the
dilution of investors' funds. If promoters and investment bankers
were permitted to take large commissions in effecting the private
on the post-incorporation-limited-offering exemption. It should be noted that the
pre-incorporation subscription exemption, unlike the post-incorporation exemption, is
available even if the subscriptions are offered by advertisement or public solicitation. Several
statutes containing post- and pre-incorporation exemptions limit their use to offers by
corporations organized in that state. See note 21 infra and accompanying text.
"Statutes in 14 states characterize the exemption in terms of the number of ultimate
shareholders after the sale of securities (ranging from 5 to 35 shareholders). The new
California statute limits the number to five. Commissions or other forms of compensation
are prohibited in most of these jurisdictions, and some statutes restrict the exemption to
offers by corporations organized in that state. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1844(10) (1967);
CAL. CoRP. CODE § 25102(h) (West Supp. 1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 502.5(15) (Supp.
1969); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1262(h) (1963); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 874(9) (Supp.
1968); MIss. CODE ANN. § 5384.5(9) (Supp. 1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-18-22(J) (1966);
OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.03(O) (Page 196.4); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 32(0(10)
(1965); TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 581-5(f) (1964); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-14(2)(i)
(Supp. 1968); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-514(b)(8) (Supp. 1968); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 3273(4)(h) (1961); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 189.07(1) (1957).
"Tennessee limits the exemption to 30 subscriptions or sales, and a maximum $100,000.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1632(G) (1964). Statutes in Georgia, Massachusetts and North
Dakota limit the exemption in terms of the number of offerees or buyers (15 to 25) and/or a
maximum dollar amount ($25,000). The exemption is generally restricted to local
corporations, and commissions or other remuneration are prohibited. GA. CODE ANN. § 97-
107(i) (1968); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. I IOA, § 3(f) (Supp. 1966); N.C. CENT. CODE
§ 10-04-06(9) (Supp. 1967).
"See note I I supra.
"Ala., Alas., Ark., Cal., Colo., Fla., Ga., Hawaii, Idaho, Ill., Ind., Iowa, Kan., Ky., La.,
Md., Mich., Miss., Mo., Mont., Neb., N.J., N.M., N.C., N.D., Okla., Ore., Pa., S.C.,
Tenn., Utah, Vt. (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4204(4) (1947)), Wash., W. Va., Wis., Wyo. See
notes 13-15 for citations to statute of the foregoing states.
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placement of securities, the equity of capital-contributing
shareholders would be diminished in direct relation to the size of
such commissions. However, it may be impossible for the
organizers of a new venture to raise the needed funds without the
assistance of professional financial intermediaries. It is submitted
that some dilution of shareholder eqiity is a better alternative than
the possible abandonment of the proposed business because of the
inability to use investment bankers.
As a compromise and to prevent a very great dilution, limits on
the amount of permissible commission might be established by
statute or administrative rule, and such commissions might be
permitted only to registered broker-dealers and not to the
promoters of the particular venture. In this connection, most of the
states limit the amount of underwriting discounts, commissions and
expenses permitted an investment banker in effecting a public
offering of securities. However, it is submitted that the better
alternative would be to allow commissions to investment bankers
without restriction on amounts. Competition in the investment
banking industry should result in competitive placement fees,
varying with the difficulty of the placement task and the degree of
risk. Furthermore, if investors are apprised of the participation of
an investment banker in a private placement and the amount of his
fee, there is no reason to interfere with the transaction.
There are other reasons justifying the use of investment bankers
in this area. Clearly, professional bankers are better equipped than
most promoters in placing securities within the limitations of the
federal and state exemptions. Fewer violations would tend to occur
if such transactions were effected by experts who regularly deal
with and have access to the funds of sophisticated investors who
could truly fend for themselves."8 Such intermediaries would be
fully familiar with the-limitation on the number of offerees and the
identity of investors contemplated by the private offering
exemption.
Of course, the cost of a private offering would be increased if
bankers were permitted to participate, but this fact does not
' in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co.. 346 U.S. 119 (1953). the Supreme Court- held that the
applicability of the section 4 exemption should turn on whether the particular class of
persons affected needed the protection of the Act or could be expected to fend for itself.
Vol. 1969: 273] 279
DUKE LA W JOURNAL
warrant the restriction. Related benefits may well offset the extra
cost. Such benefits may include the continued interest of the
investment banker in the company with respect to additional
financing or a future public offering which might be desirable, not
only to the company, but to the banker's customers who are locked
in with the company's investment securities. 9
As a practical matter, promoters who need professional
assistance to accomplish a private offering generally go to New
York firms who place the securities with residents of New York or
one of the other few states which do not proscribe commissions.
Thus, New York investment bankers have a virtual monopoly on
the private equity-money market. It is submitted that investment
firms serve a highly desirable purpose as suppliers of venture
capital and that their function in this respect should not be
excluded to the profit of New York firms. Moreover, residents of
states with such prohibitions should not be denied the opportunity
to participate in private placements effected by financial
intermediates. It should be noted that while several of the state
statutes provide that administrators, by rule or order, may waive or
limit the prohibition of commissions or other remuneration,"0 to the
writer's knowledge, there have been no published rules or orders
waiving the restrictions.
The restriction limiting the private offering exemption to
corporations organized under the laws of the state where the
offering is made is common to many of the states2' While research
has not revealed stated policies for this limitation, it is suggested
that the probable reasons are the taxes and fees which are generated
by requiring businesses to incorporate in a state before they can avail
themselves of the limited offering exemption. Furthermore, it may
be that the requirement of incorporation in a given jurisdiction
could result in encouraging firms to establish their businesses in
that jurisdiction to avoid the expense of qualifying to do business in
jurisdictions other than the state of incorporation.
Under this unwarranted restriction, a New York corporation
"To avoid being viewed as a statutory underwriter, purchasers must buy for investment
rather than with a view toward distribution; thus their ability to dispose of the acquired stock
is substantially limited. See H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURMEs LAW 146-66 (1966).
" UNIFORM SECURITiEs ACT § 402(b)(9) (1969 version).
21 See notes 13-15 supra.
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could not offer or sell its shares to a single person in a state such
as Florida. This restriction becomes particularly unreasonable with
respect to a New York promoter who forms his firm in his home
state but wishes to offer the securities to a few members of his
family who reside in California and Florida. Such offerees would
not be afforded significantly greaterprotection as shareholders by
virtue of holding shares in a Florida or California corporation
rather than a New York corporation, except perhaps with respect
to obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign corporation in a suit. Yet
there may be sound business reasons for organizing the company in
Delaware or in New York where the promoter and active manager
resides and where the firm will do its business. Such reasons
outweigh the remote possibilities of litigation. Furthermore, the
state of incorporation is not a factor with respect to qualifying an
issuer's securities in a public offering. In this regard, it is difficult
to conceive of a reason for treating close corporations and public
companies in different ways.
In all but a few of the states which have a limited offering
exemption, state administrators have taken the position, nowhere
required by statute, that lawyers, accountants, promoters and
incorporators who take shares for their promotional services must
be counted in computing the number of offerees or ultimate
shlireholders available under the exemption. 22 Thus, if the
exemption is limited to 10 offerees and shares are reserved for five
or six persons for promotional considerations, the requisite
financing can be raised from only four or five outside investors. As
the number of capital-contributing offerees becomes smaller,
promoters must obviously raise a proportionately greater amount
from each offeree; and if the entire capital is contributed by a few
persons, it is likely that these persons will demand control of the
corporation. The large investor has more to protect than the small
one and would, therefore, have a greater interest in securing
control. Furthermore, large investors in new businesses generally
tend to be more financially sophisticated than do small
contributors, and such sophistication is often accompanied by
control demands. However, control by outside individuals is
2 This information has been obtained through questionnaires sent to state securities
administrators by the author.
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undesirable to promoters who believe strongly that their
innovations, planning and efforts are a greater relative contribution
to the new firm than is the investor's capital. Accordingly, it is not
surprising to find that promoters desire the investor's money more
than his active paiticipation in policy decisions.
The problem of balance of control is a major obstacle in the
financing of new businesses through the private offering of equity
securities. Many promoters would rather sell their idea or invention
outright-if they were able to find a buyer-rather than accept the
loss of control over the development of the innovation in a firm
where they would participate with only a minority interest. If one
sells the idea outright, he is certain of some pecuniary return, but if
he participates as a minority stockholder, he cannot be assured that
the corporation will pursue the direction which he feels is necessary
for profitable development of his innovation.
The number of permissible offerees thus plays a vital role at this
stage in the promoters' plans. Because of the. problems of balance
of control, the restriction of the limited offering exemption to a
stated number of offerees is unrealistic, especially in view of the
inclusion of insiders in this number. From a policy standpoint, the
identity of the offerees is much more important than the number,
and should be solely determinative of the availability of the
exemption. It is difficult to understand how an offering and sale to
40 or 50 financially sophisticated persons who can fend for
themselves would create greater dangers than an offering and sale
to ten financially inexperienced widows. Yet the latter placement
would be permissible in the Uniform Securities Act jurisdictions
whereas the former offering would be prohibited2 3 Although several
statutes provide administrators with authority to increase the
number of offerees by rule or order, such rules or orders have not
been forthcoming. It is submitted that the private or limited
offering ,exemption should be revised so that there is no restriction
on the number of offerees provided such offerees are financially
sophisticated.
The problems regarding the balance of control of the firn, and
the limited number of offerees or shareholders may be further
" The offering to ten financially inexperienced widows may not, however, comply with the




intensified by a tax consideration. Assuming a promoter of a new
venture has secured the requisite financing from the ten permitted
offerees and the outsiders are willing to allow the promoter to
retain control, the promoter-who received his shares in
consideration of ideas, efforts and planning-might be thereupon
confronted with a taxable event.24 He may not have sufficient funds
to pay the tax unless he is able to borrow against or sells a portion
of his shares. But most lenders do not accept investment or control
stock as collateral,25 and if he were to sell shares. outright to a few
persons, control might be shifted away from him. Furthermore, his
sale to a few persons shortly after consummation of the
corporation's initial financing might destroy the original limited or
private offering exemption. 26 Such additional problems further
demonstrate the unrealistic restrictions inherent in the limited
offering exemption as presently constituted.
Promoters often seek to avoid these limitations by means of a
public offering of securities, and this approach circumvents many
of the aforementioned difficulties. A small investor is not likely to
demand control, and if the shares can be diffused among a large
number of unrelated investors, promoters should be able to retain
control with less than a majority of the outstanding shares.
Although there are blue sky restrictions on the amount of
underwriter's compensation, investment bankers may be used to
accomplish the offering. Furthermore, there are no restrictions as
to the state where the corporation is organized. Promoters may
also plan the capitalization so that they can sell shares to satisfy
tax liabilities and still retain control. Finally, the number of
offerees may be unlimited.
A public offering therefore seems to solve many of the
promoter's problems. However, the promoter cannot simply go
from door to door until the requisite capital is raised. Marketing of
securities has become a complex, time-consuming and expensive
proposition. First of all, the cost of a full registration with the
Securities and Exchange Commission may be prohibitive. Even a
U The shares would constitute ordinary income to him.
I Professional lenders generally do not accept investment or control stock as collateral, in
view of the dictum in SEC v. Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d 485, 489-90 (2d Cir. 1960).
" The various transactions might be integrated and thereby result in too many offerees or
ultimate shareholders under the applicable statutes.
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"junior" registration under the Regulation A exemption27 is
expensive and an intrastate offering, exempt from federal
registration requirements, must nevertheless be registered with the
state securities commissions at considerable cost.28
But cost is only the first obstacle. A more significant problem is
the restriction on the permissible amount of promotion shares and
options. Ideally, the promoter would like to retain 51 percent or
more of the equity for himself and publicly sell the remainder. He
may feel that such control is necessary for the success of the
enterprise and that such a large equity position is proper
compensation for his entrepreneurship. But, in almost all of the
states, promotion stock, "cheap stock," and options are limited to
stated percentages, or amounts which the administrators may deem
reasonable. Formal rules with respect to this matter have been
adopted in 20 states,29 and in 23 states the administrators have
discretion to set the amount depending upon the circumstances of
each offering? °
In the states with formal rules, the promotion stock limitations
are characterized in terms of (1) a maximum percentage of the
outstanding -stock after completion of the public offering,31 (2) a
"SEC Reg. A., 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-263 (1968).
With respect to such expenses, see note 8 supra.
CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 260.140.31 (1969) (I BLUE SKY L. REP. 8619 (Dec. 20, 1968));
NEV. REV. STAT. § 90.155 (1965); Regs. Ariz. Corp. Comm., Order No. S-5, S-7; (I BLUE
SKY L. REP. I' IF 6655, 6657 (Oct. 30, 1963)); ARK. (not published); REGS. COLO. Div. SEC..
RULE V (D) (I BLUE SKY L. REP. 9706 (Feb. 13, 1967)); Rules Fla. Sec. Comm., 330-1.08 (I
BLUE SKY L. REP. 13,608 (Nov. 7, 1968)); Regs. Idaho Comm'r. Fin. § 27 (1 BLUE SKY
L. REP. 15,616 (Jan. 17, 1968)); Rules & Regs. under Ill. Sec. Law, Rule 150 (1 BLUE SKY
L. REP. 16,627 (Sept. 14, 1967)); Regs. Kan. Sec. Comm'r., art. 81-7-1(C) (2 BLUE SKY
L. REP. 19,707 (Jun. 13, 1966)); Ky. Div. Sec., Supp. Admin. Ruling no. 1 (2 BLUE SKY
L. REP. 20,601 (Dec. 21, 1966)); Mich. Sec. Bur., Rule 706.6 (2 BLUE SKY L. REP.
25,635 (Mar. 13, 1969)); Minn. Admin. Rules & Reg., SDiv 42 (2 BLUE SKY L. REP.
26,604 (Aug. 12, 1966)); Okla. Sec. Comm. Statement of Policy (2 BLUE SKY L. REP.
39,707 (Aug.*l, 1967)); Ore. (not published); S.D. Regs. Comm'r. Sec., Pt. IIG (3 BLUE SKY
L. REP. 44,609 (Nov. 15, 1967)); Tenn. Comm'r. of Ins. & Banking, Admin. Rulings, Pt.
1 (3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 45,631 (Nov. 15, 1967)); Tex. Sec. Comm'r. Regs. (3 BLUE SKY
L. REP. 46,601 (Nov. 7, 1968)); Utah Sec. Comm., t-orm Letter #10 (1967); Wash.
Adm'r Sec., Rule I1 (3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 50,611 (Oct. 10, 1968)); Wyo. Secretary of
State, Rules & Reg.. ch. IV, § I(c) (3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 53,612 (April 19, 1968)).
10 For the statutory authority permitting state securities administrators to set amounts of
promoter participation, see. e.g., UNIFORM SECURITIES Act §§ 306, 412.
31 Not more than 10% in Colo. and Ky., 15% in Ariz. and Fla., 33 1/3% in Ill. and Ore.,
and 50% in Idaho and Wash. See note 29 supra.
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stated ratio between promotional securities and total securities
outstanding after the offering,3 2 (3) the amount of dilution of the
public investors' interestas or (4) a dollar amount which must be
paid by promoters in cash or its equivalent depending on the price
charged to outside investors. Several states have adopted two or
more of these tests.
In one state, the administrator has published a policy stating:
"No promotional or free stock-some consideration may be given
to persons for services rendered on a reasonable basis." Another
administrator answered a questionnaire from this writer in the
following manner: "[we] generally try to adjust the price to the
public to be closer to that issued to promoters. If persuasion does
not work, we will permit withdrawal of the application." 6 A
statement of policy adopted by the Midwest Securities
Commissioners Association, adhered to by a number of
administrators, provides that promotional shares or "cheap stock"
shall be "reasonable in amount and the consideration shall have a
reasonable relationship to the proposed public offering price.''37
Thus there may be considerable uncertainty in those jurisdictions
which adhere to the vague standard of the Midwest Securities
Commissioners policy. The public offering price, however, still
provides some limit upon the promotional stock the entrepreneur
may retain.
Promoters who cannot afford to purchase shares at the public
offering price are thus seriously limited in their participation in the
new firm. Although the policy for such restrictions is not explained
in the rules, it may be assumed that the objective is to prevent the
interests of outside investors from being diluted by virtue of
excessive valuation of the 6ntrepreneur's services. This theory
12 1 to 2 in Cal. and 1 to 3 in Minn. and S.D. See note 29 supra.
= Usually note more than 33 1/3%. E.g., Ill., Kan., Okla., Mich., Utah. See note 29
supra.
3 For example, the Kentucky rule provides that stock offered to the investing public at
$5.00 per share may not be purchased by an insider for less than $2.50 per share. See note
29 supra.
"Utah Sec. Comm., Admin. Policies, Form I-H (3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 47,605 (May 17,
1967)).
N This answer was received from the Securities Division, Department of State, State of
South Carolina.
"Statement of Policy on Cheap Stock, June 27, 1968 (1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 4761 (Nov.
7, 1968)).
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implies that there is some relationship between the amount of
capital contributed by outside investors and the value of the
promoter's innovation 8 But such an assumption is unwarranted.
One innovation may be ultimately worth 1,000 times the initial
capital required to promote it, and another innovation may be
worth only ten percent of such capital. State securities
administrators are certainly no better equipped than the
marketplace to evaluate the worth of an idea, yet the statutes give
them this power.
With respect to those jurisdictions wherein the administrators
have not adopted formal rules for maximum amounts of promotion
stock, the promoter might be forced to expend large sums of
money and time only to learn that the administrator views the
promoter's proposed participation as unreasonable. A survey of
these states reveals that most of the administrators have not even
formulated standards or guides by which they determine the
permissible number of promotion shares. The unreasonableness of
this entire proposition is thus compounded by uncertainty.
The promoter, confronted with these restrictions, might consider
several other possibilities for increasing his participation and
maintaining control. He might contemplate promoting the
corporation with two classes of common stock, retaining the voting
stock for himself and selling the non-voting shares to the public; or,
he might retain all of the common stock for himself and issue
preferred shares to the outside investors. However, such plans will
not qualify under the rules of some state securities commissions
with respect to many new ventures3 As an alternative, he might
consider reserving sufficient options to insure control and provide
suitable compensation for his entrepreneurship. But, here again, the
promoter is stymied. Most jurisdictions limit the permissible
amount of options, often to a number that does not exceed ten
percent o'f the stock outstanding after completion of the proposed
See Manne& Mofsky, What Price Blue Sky? BARRON'S, Aug. 5, 1968, at 5, col. 4.
" See, for example, the limitations on the use of preferred stock and non-voting common
stock in Rules, Fla. Sec. Comm., 330-1.05, 330-1.09 (i BLUE SKY L. REP. 13,605 &
13.609 (Nov. 7, 1968)). The rationale for the restriction on non-voting common stock is the
prevention of voting control of new ventures by persons who do not contribute substantial
capital in the organization of the firm. The reason for the limitation on preferred stock is to
prevent new ventures from publicly issuing senior securities in the absence of an earnings
history to support such securiti&.
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offering. And, in some jurisdictions, underwriters' warrants are
included in the ten percent option limitation!'
To compensate for the restriction on the permissible amount of
promotion stock and options, an entrepreneur might raise the price
per share to be paid by the public investors. This at least would
increase the net asset value of the promoter's interest. However,
many administrators have adopted rules or taken informal
positions which, in effect, fix the price for which shares may be
sold to outsiders. Such price-fixing is intended to prevent "too
much" dilution of the outsiders' interests.
For example, in new ventures, one securities commission,
without adopting a formal rule, limits the public offering price to
two or two and one-half times the consideration paid by insiders.
This same commission has adopted a rule which further limits the
amount which can be raised publicly; thus, a corporation cannot
sell securities in that jurisdiction unless it has a net worth of
approximately 25 percent of the amount sought to be raised in the
public offering.4 To comply with this rule, entrepreneurs often sell
shares privately to amass enough net worth to qualify for a public
offering. This process can easily result in a loss of control to the
promotional group. It is not surprising, therefore, to find many
promoters leaving their home states to seek underwriters who can
effect public distributions of securities in New York.
Requiring capital investments from entrepreneurs before they
may promote new ventures via a public offering is tantamount to a
rule restricting entrepreneurial services to the affluent. Such a
proposition, if openly suggested, probably would not be condoned,
but blue sky administrators do not seem concerned with these
matters.
Another problem connected with the restrictions on promotion
stock arises because of the rule in most states which requires
escrow of promotional shares. Of the 39 states which require
escrow arrangements,4 18 do not permit release until dividends
"See. e.g., Regs. Colo. Div. See., Rule V(G) & (H) (I BLUE SKY L. REP. 9706 (Feb.
13, 1967)).
41 Rules, Fla. See. Comm., 330-1.04 (1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 1 13,604 (Nov. 7, 1968)).
2 ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 53, § 34(b) (Supp. 1967); ALAsKA STAT. ANN. § 45.55.1 10(g)
(Supp. 1966); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1876 (1967); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-1245(g)
(1966); CAL. CORP. CODE § 25141 (West Supp. 1968); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 125-1-
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aggregating five to six percent have been earned and/or
paid on the outside investor's shares.4 The remaining jurisdictions44
allow release at the discretion of the state regulators or after a
prescribed time period (usually two or three years).45
Few new companies earn profits during the first year or two of
existence out of which dividends can be paid, and even if profits
were earned early in the firm's life, sound business planning might
dictate the use of profits in internal expansion and development. It
would be unlikely, therefore, that the promoter could realize profits
on his stock soon after the promotion of the venture. But if he
needs funds to satisfy tax obligations on his shares or if he wishes
to make additional use of some profits, he will be forced to seek
other means of releasing the stock from escrow. One enticing
method might be a merger of the new enterprise with another
company which could afford to pay the dividend. As a result,
restrictive blue sky laws may foster shotgun mergers.
It is apparent that blue sky legislation may result ic important
and dangerous economic consequences with respect to three related
entrepreneurial problems: financing a new business, promoter
10(7) (1963); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.18 (1962); GA. CODE ANN. § 97-104.1(C) (1968);
HAWAII REV. LAWS § 199-14 (Supp. 1965); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1428 (1967); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 121- , § 137.11(E) (Supp. 1967); IND. ANN. STAT. § 25-860() (Supp. 1968);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 502.20 (1949); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-1259(d) (1964); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 292.380 (1963); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:713 (1965); MICH. STAT., ANN.
§ 19.776(305)(0 (Supp. 1968); MISS. CODE ANN. § 5364 (Supp. 1968); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
409.305(0 (Supp. 1968); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 15-2011 (1967); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 8-1108(2) (Supp. 1965); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:3-61 (Supp. 1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-
18-19(C) (1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78-11(l) (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-08-1(1)
(Supp. 1967); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.09(K) (Page 1964); OKLA STAT, ANN. tit. 71,
§ 305(g) (1965); ORE. REV. STAT. § 59.085(3) (1967); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-165 (1962);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1650 (1963); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-11(7) (Supp. 1968); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4223 (1947); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-510(h) (Supp. 1968); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 21.20.250 (1961); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3273(16) (1961); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 189.17(1) (1955); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-117-11(g) (1965); Minn. Admin. Rules & Regs,,
SDiv 43 (2 BLUE SKY L. REP. 26,604 (Aug. 12, 1966) ); S.C. Regs. Comm'r. Sec., Pt. I IG
(3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 44,609 (Nov. 15, 1967)).
'Ala., Ark., Colo., Fla., Hawaii, Iowa, Kan., Ky., La., Neb., N.M., N.C., N.D., Ohio,
Ore., Vt., Va., W. Va. For citations see note 42 supra.
I Alas., Ariz., Cal., Ga., Idaho, Ill., Ind., Mich., Minn., Miss., Mo., Mont., N.J., Okla.,
S.C., S.D., Tenn., Utah, Wash., Wis., Wyo. For citations see note 42 supra.
1 For additional information concerning the escrow aspects of the state securities laws, see
L. Loss & E. CowIr, BLUE SKY LAW 38, 78-79, 311-12 (1958). See also the statutes cited
in note 42 supra.
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control and sufficient reward for entrepreneurship. There are other
significant economic ramifications, but these three problems are
particularly serious with regard to the development of new firms. If
the promoter is forced to give up control by virtue of the
restrictions contained in the limited offering exemption or the rules
limiting promotion shares, control will shift to those persons who
can afford to purchase it. The regulatory system precludes the no-
asset promoter from competing effectively with investment bankers
and affluent persons for control, and accordingly, the latter persons
secure control at a lower price than would be paid if the
entrepreneur were not hindered by restrictive statutes and rules.
The arguments for a greater freedom of access to the financial
market, both private and public, demonstrate some of the fallacies
underlying the blue sky laws, especially in connection with the
promotion of new ventures. The opposing argument, in favor of the
paternalistic approach of securities legislation, is based upon the
theory that full and fair disclosure is not enough. This theory
submits that there exist fraudulent promoters and unsound business
schemes, and that such promoters should not be permitted to take
advantage of public investors, even though the whole truth be told
in a prospectus cleared with the Securities and Exchange
Commission and state agencies.
Advocates of the merit approach to securities regulation
contend that the prospectus %ytiich has evolved since the enactment
of the federal law in 1933 is too long and too complex to be
meaningful to the average investor; it may be understood by
lawyers and accountants but is beyond the comprehension of most
investors. Furthermore, it is contended that the success of certain
ventures is just too doubtful or speculative to warrant public
participation, in spite of the fact that the doubtfulness and
speculative nature of the offering are indicated in large type on the
cover page and in the introductory statement of the prospectus.
Thus even when the public offerees are cognizant of the extreme
risks involved in certain offerings, their opportunity to speculate is
foreclosed. The philosophy underlying the blue sky laws is, in short,
the saving of "a fool from his folly."
The merit approach has probably saved some investors from the
.loss of hard-earned dollars. There is little doubt that there have
always been and probably always will be unscrupulous promoters
with shaky business schemes, and that the blue sky laws do have an
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impact limiting these abuses. But this reality does not in itself
justify the severe form of blue sky regulation. Its justification can
be based only upon a balancing of interests, whereby the benefits of
such regulation measure significantly greater than the costs, and
this kind of measurement would most appropriately be of a
scientific nature performed by trained economists.
To date, lawyers and economists have not examined the cost to
society stemming from blue sky statutes and rules. It is not enough
to justify the regulatory scheme with such pat answers as: "the
publiconeeds protection." A few fraudulent promoters and unsound
business schemes do not in themselves justify such regulation.
Surely, the matters deserve a higher level of analysis. While it is
not within the scope of this article to devise the kind of analysis
needed in this area, one approach might be to compare the
economic development of a restrictive state, such as California, with
that of New York, a nonrestrictive state. Although other factors
contributing to the growth of these states would have to be isolated,
such analysis is not beyond the reach of contemporary economists.
It is unlikely that the appropriate study would come from the
North American Securities Administrators or from the Midwest
Securities Commissioners, because these organizations simply do
not have the facilities and personnel necessary for a theoretical
and empirical economic analysis. The various state securities
commissions, already overburdened with too much work and
inadequate staffs, are also not equipped for the task. Perhaps the
Securities and Exchange Commission, which enjoys a continuing
relationship with the various state administrators, would be the
proper organization to conduct the study. Another possibility
would be for state law revision commissions to sponsor independent
projects by specialists. In any event, it is hoped that this
presentation suggests the practical desirability of such studies by a
qualified group in the immediate future.
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